

6 April 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Staff Meeting Minutes of 6 April 1979

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The Director chaired the meeting. []

The Director advised that his breakfast meeting with several Senators was very encouraging given their support of CIA positions on FOIA, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, and other matters. Mr. Carlucci suggested that the Agency watch for legislative vehicles other than the Authorization Bill to address these topics. He noted that he has been invited to testify before the Government Operations Committee on FOIA. []

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In response to the Director's question, Bowie and [] noted their understanding that Lehman was recuperating and expected to return to work within a couple of weeks. []


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Hetu said that he discovered that the Covert Action Bulletin was being sold at the State Department newsstand. Mr. Carlucci said that he called State, which promised to take appropriate action. []

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Hitz advised that Senator Stevens attended the SALT briefing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Glenn asked how the loss [] affected capabilities regarding the SALT I treaty.

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Hitz reiterated that the SSCI mark-up would take place at 1400 hours today. He added that he would be meeting with Congressman Mineta this morning regarding the Democratic position on the budget. []

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Returning to his earlier concerns, Taylor asked if the Director or Deputy Director could call Congressman Boland asking him to influence Congressman Burlison to postpone some of his [] budget questions. Hitz suggested this might be worthwhile, and the Director agreed to do so. []


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Hitz noted that this morning's breakfast with several Senators went well. The Republican members do not expect charter legislation to be completed this session. The Agency should therefore consider holding hearings on other subjects. The Director said his preference would be to address problems relating to Agee, FOIA, and the Hughes/Ryan Amendment, in that order. []

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Lapham reported that during the last six weeks he has met with Justice officials to develop a "gray-mail bill," stipulating pretrial and trial procedures for handling questions regarding classified information. He opined that a good bill has resulted and will be forwarded to OMB next week. It probably has a fair chance of becoming law. The Director said that this topic could be added to others for discussion with Congress.

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Dirks reported that bombs were exploded outside the Israeli and Egyptian Embassies in Nicosia. Security has been increased around U.S. installations there.

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[] suggested that thought be given to a strategy for Congressional briefings once the [] decisions are made. The Director asked Hitz to develop the same and disseminate a list of which committees should be briefed. He suggested that [] staff start developing briefings similar to the one provided to the SCC.

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[] should be involved in preparing the budget aspects of the briefing and Dirks in the personnel questions. (Action: OLC, CT, RM & DDS&T) []

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Highlighting the 2 April Cabinet Meeting, the Director said that a technical amendment to the Ethics in Government Act will restrict former Government employees only from working on matters that they were "substantially and personally involved with" during their Government careers. The Director added that an extended discussion took place regarding the importance of balancing the budget.

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The Director noted his understanding of the current status of the SALT negotiations. Hitz said that the Agency has done very well to date in not being drawn into the political debate regarding the treaty and should be very cautious to continue along this same line.

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In response to Taylor's question, the Director said that he talked to Congressman Addabbo asking him not to reopen [redacted] at this time, and the Congressman made no commitment but said that he would discuss this matter with House Appropriations Committee Staffer Snodgrass. Mr. Carlucci noted that Admiral Inman brought his attention to a problem regarding [redacted] affecting the CIA/NSA working relationship. He asked NFAC to look into this matter. [redacted] explained that House Appropriations Staffer Snodgrass is interested in developing a national plan for drawing all telemetry processing together. (Action: NFAC) [redacted]

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
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Noting an employee complaint addressed to him had been delayed in reaching him because of preliminary staffing, the Director asked that such letters come to him more promptly. [redacted]

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Attachment



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Eugene Mihasco

The Clandestine Service, Fondly

By T. L. Squier

McLEAN, Va. — Toward the end of my 27 years with what used to be called the Clandestine Service of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Service was badly, and probably inevitably, wounded. At a time when this part of our defense Establishment is trying to make difficult adjustments, it seems that a mythology has grown up about the agency that makes it difficult for the American people — the sole owners and proprietors of the C.I.A. — to think clearly about it.

The news media, and popular fiction, have created a sinister vocabulary that never existed in the real world. Neither I nor any colleagues ever heard or used the words "mole," "terminate with extreme prejudice," "black-bag job" and "destabilize" before they began to appear in print. The creation of a vocabulary-that-never-was is only the surface expression of a myth that spreads and expands by acceptance of the worst version of any incident, and the combination of the worst cases, into a vision of the Service as a "rogue elephant" without moral sense or respect for law.

In fact, the "rogue elephant" was an obedient and responsive servant of the people as represented by generally conscientious and responsible Presidents. It was representative of the country, although probably unbalanced. Its staff was more liberal politically and more romantic in its belief in the old-fashioned concepts of duty and patriotism than the population as a whole. The mixture of Ivy Leaguers, Iowa farm boys, Jewish immigrants, bureaucrats and Office of Strategic Services veterans shared a sincere, if naive, belief that America and its ideals were the hope of the world, that the world was a risky place, and that the Service (known successively as the

Directorate of Plans, then the Directorate of Operations) was a front-line guardian of the state.

In the early 1950's, when "crown jewels" meant Allen Dulles's best wartime agents rather than a list of misdeeds delivered voluntarily to Congress by the agency itself, we were deeply conscious of the need to maintain rigid moral standards, and we frequently discussed the dangers of succumbing to the temptation to use clandestine skills improperly.

A second, if less-frequent watchword was: "The Service does not engage in assassination." We believed this to be true and it was although we now know that there were two half-hearted and amateurish plans developed, presumably at the urgent request of "higher authority." With the possible exception of one flamboyant staffer who had become tired and ill in the service of his country, I doubt that any of those charged with this planning ever believed that the attempts would take place. The very clumsiness of the planning demonstrates how far assassination was from the tradition and consciousness of the Service. The things we did we did well.

For most of us, the heart of our business was espionage, which we viewed, and still view, as an honorable and necessary service conducted in the interests of peace. We did not "subvert" those who helped us and although some agents were financially motivated, most, and the best, worked for ideological reasons, sharing our view of our country as the best hope of a confused and suffering world. There may have been cases of recruitment through blackmail although I personally never heard of one, and most of us

believed that blackmail and similar methods were inappropriate and unsound.

The few shameful things that were done in the 25 or so years that we, the Congress, and a Presidential commission have reviewed can be traced to an unfortunate side-effect of compartmentation. Because of the energy and ingenuity of the opposition, the C.I.A. has long limited knowledge of sensitive operations to those with a real "need-to-know." Unfortunately, compartmentation could, and sometimes did, frustrate the normal system of internal checks and balances. Activities that were improper and that were sheltered by compartmentation may well have developed through a kind of creeping degradation in which an activity began legitimately, within the charter, but gradually drifted into impropriety as a result of excessive zeal, cumulative bad judgment, or of stupid or overworked supervisors.

The world is not appreciably wiser or safer than it was the 1950's and our country still needs a clandestine service. The task of changing our beloved old Service into something that better reflects our changing society and its needs can only be hindered if the people on whom the Service must depend perceive it in terms of myth rather than reality.

T. L. Squier, who retired from the Central Intelligence Agency in 1978, is writing a novel about terrorism.